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Abstract-
 
: Mobile ad hoc  networking (MANET) is gradually emerging to be very important in the 
growth of wireless technology.  This is anticipated to offer a range of flexible services to mobile 
and nomadic users by means of integrated homogeneous architecture. The proper routing 
protocol is necessary for better communication in MANET. One of the existing reliable protocols 
is Ad Hoc On-Demand Vector Routing (AODV) protocol which is a reactive routing protocol for ad 
hoc and mobile networks that maintains routes only between nodes that wants to communicate. 
There are various security issues to be considered in this protocol. In order to provide security for 
AODV protocol, Secure Ad Hoc On-Demand Vector Routing (SAODV) can be used. SAODV is an 
extension of the AODV routing protocol that can be used to shield the route discovery process by 
providing security characteristics like integrity and authentication. For secure protocol, digital 
signature, hash chains, etc., can be used in routing. This paper surveys on various techniques 
available for securing the mobile ad hoc network.
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A Survey on Security Analysis of Routing 
Protocols 
J.Viji Gripsyα, Dr. Anna Saro Vijendran
Abstract- Mobile ad hoc networking (MANET) is gradually 
emerging to be very important in the growth of wireless 
technology.  This is anticipated to offer a range of flexible 
services to mobile and nomadic users by means of integrated 
homogeneous architecture. The proper routing protocol is 
necessary for better communication in MANET. One of the 
existing reliable protocols is Ad Hoc On-Demand Vector 
Routing (AODV) protocol which is a reactive routing protocol 
for ad hoc and mobile networks that maintains routes only 
between nodes that wants to communicate. There are various 
security issues to be considered in this protocol. In order to 
provide security for AODV protocol, Secure Ad Hoc On-
Demand Vector Routing (SAODV) can be used. SAODV is an 
extension of the AODV routing protocol that can be used to 
shield the route discovery process by providing security 
characteristics like integrity and authentication. For secure 
protocol, digital signature, hash chains, etc., can be used in 
routing. This paper surveys on various techniques available 
for securing the mobile ad hoc network. 
Keywords: Mobile Ad-hoc Network, Routing Protocols, 
AODV protocol, SA-AODV protocol 
I. Introduction 
n ad hoc network is usually defined as an 
infrastructureless network. This means that a 
network is lacking the standard routing 
infrastructure like fixed routers and routing backbones. 
Usually, the ad hoc nodes are mobile and the 
fundamental communication medium is wireless. Every 
ad hoc node possibly will be able to of act as a router. 
Such ad hoc networks may arise in personal area 
networking, meeting rooms and conferences, disaster 
relief and rescue operations, battlefield operations, etc. 
By considering the special characteristics of 
MANET, designing a well-organized and dependable 
routing protocol strategy is a huge challenge. Currently, 
various ad hoc routing protocols have been proposed 
and developed by various researchers like DSDV, 
OLSR, TBRPF, AODV, DSR and ZRP. From all these, 
Ad-hoc On-demand Distance Vector (AODV) is 
recognized as one of the main IETF standards for 
MANET routing. On the other hand, AODV aims on 
improving routing performance, but provides only slight 
consideration to routing security, which indicates that it  
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is susceptible to various attacks from malicious, 
compromised and selfish nodes. 
 
Figure 1: Route Discovery Procedure of AODV Protocol 
AODV protocol is a reactive routing protocol for 
ad hoc and mobile networks. This represents that AODV 
will not perform any action until a node requires 
broadcasting a packet to a node for which it does not 
know a route. In addition, it only maintains routes 
among nodes that require communicating. Its routing 
messages do not enclose information about the entire 
route path, but simply regarding the source and the 
destination. Hence, routing messages have a constant 
size, independently of the number of hops of the route. 
It utilizes destination sequence numbers to indicate how 
fresh a route is that is used to grant loop freedom.  
In AODV, a node performs route identification 
by flooding the network with a ’Route Request’ 
message (RREQ). When it arrives a node that knows 
the requested route, it reply with a ’Route Reply’ 
message (RREP) that goes back to the creator of the 
RREQ. Next, all the nodes of the identified path have 
routes to both ends of the path. Beside these routing 
messages, ’Route Error’ messages (RERR) are utilized 
to alert the other nodes that several nodes are not any 
longer reachable because of link breakage. The route 
discovery procedure of AODV protocol is provided in 
figure 1. 
But AODV lacks security features which lead to 
great vulnerability for attacking. To provide security for 
AODV, Secure Ad Hoc On-Demand Vector Routing 
(SAODV) s used which focuses on using various 
techniques like digital signature, hash chains, etc., This 
paper focuses on analyzing various security enabled 
protocols for providing better security for MANET. 
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II. Literature Survey 
As AODV lacks security mechanisms, malicious 
nodes can carry out several attacks just by not 
behaving based on the AODV rules. Therefore, to 
guarantee the entire security of the network, it is 
important to create security mechanisms that can 
withstand malicious attacks from insiders who have 
entire control of several nodes. For the purpose of 
protection against insider attacks, it is required to 
realize how an insider can attack a wireless ad-hoc 
network. Various attacks have been discussed in 
various literatures. According to the composition of 
operations for carrying out attack as mentioned in 
above article, misuses of AODV have been divided into 
two categories: atomic misuses and compound 
misuses. Intuitively, atomic misuses are carrying out by 
controlling a single routing message that cannot be any 
more separable. On the contrary, compound misuses 
are composed of multiple atomic misuses, and possibly 
normal uses of the routing protocol. Initially, it is 
required to determine a number of misuse goals that an 
inside attacker may require to achieve and are listed as 
follows. 
Route Disruption (RD): Route Disruption is nothing but 
either breaking down an existing route or preventing a 
new route from being created. 
Node Isolation (NI): Node isolation indicates the 
preventing of a provided node from communicating with 
any other node in the network. It varies from Route 
Disruption in that Route Disruption is targeting at a route 
with two provided endpoints, while node isolation is 
intended at every possible routes. 
Route Invasion (RI): Route invasion means that an 
inside attacker adds itself into a route between two 
endpoints of a communication channel. 
Resource Consumption (RC): Resource consumption is 
nothing but consuming the communication bandwidth 
in the network or storage space at every nodes. For 
example, an inside attacker may consume the network 
bandwidth by either forming a loop in the network. As 
an example, route disruption, route invasion and node 
isolation has been shown diagrammatically using figure 
2, 3 and 4 respectively. 
 
Figure 2: Node M performing Route Disruption for path 
A-C
 
 
Figure 3: Route invasion 
 
Figure 4: Node isolation 
Investigation of atomic misuses can be carried 
out in an effective manner by means of understanding 
the causes of probable atomic misuse actions. All 
atomic misuse action is an inseparable manipulation of 
one routing message. In particular, the atomic misuse 
actions in AODV have been divided into the following 
four categories: 
Drop (DR): Here, the attacker just drops the received 
routing message.  
Modify and Forward (MF): Once the routing message is 
received, the attacker alters one or more fields in the 
message and then forwards the message to its 
neighbors through unicast or broadcast. 
Forge Reply (FR): The attacker sends a faked message 
in reply to the received routing message. Forge Reply is 
generally related to the misuse of RREP messages that 
are in response of RREQ messages. 
Active Forge (AF): The attacker sends a faked routing 
message without receiving any associated message. 
The most interesting and complex one is that an attacker 
can merge several atomic misuses in a planned way and 
launch them.  
Perlman [8] provides a link state routing 
protocol that attains Byzantine Robustness. Even 
though the protocol is greatly robust, it needs a very 
high overhead linked with public key encryption. Secure 
BGP [9] aims to protect the Border Gateway Protocol by 
using PKI (Public Key Infrastructure) and IPsec. 
Zhou et al., [10] primarily discuss key 
management for securing ad hoc networks. The author 
offers a section to secure routing, but basically 
conclude that nodes can shield routing data in the 
same manner they shield data traffic. They also 
examine that denial-of-service attacks against routing 
will be considered as damage and routed around. 
Dahill et al., [11] presented ARAN, a routing 
protocol for ad hoc networks that utilizes authentication 
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and needs the utilization of a trusted certificate server. 
In ARAN, each node that forwards a route discovery or 
a route reply message should also sign it. Additionally, 
it is implemented to reply attacks by means of error 
messages if not the nodes contain time 
synchronization. 
Papadimitratos et al., [12] put forth a protocol 
(SRP) that can be used to various available routing 
protocols particularly DSR and IERP. SRP needs that, 
for all the route discovery, source and destination 
should contain a security association among them. In 
addition, the author does not even refer to route error 
messages. Hence, they are not sheltered, and any 
attackable node can just create error messages by 
considering other nodes as source. 
Hash chains are utilized in better manner for 
obtaining good authentication in various techniques that 
attempts to protect routing protocols. In [13], [14] and 
[15], hash chains are used for the purpose of providing 
delayed key disclosure. Whereas in [16], hash chains 
are utilized to generate single-time signatures that can 
be checked instantly.  
In SEAD, hash chains are utilizes in grouping 
with DSDV-SQ [18] by Hu et al., [17]. For each provided 
time all node contains its individual hash chain. The 
hash chain is separated into segments; elements in a 
segment are helpful in securing hop counts in a same 
manner as it is performed in SAODV. The size of the 
hash chain is identified when it is created. Following the 
usage of every elements of the hash chain a new one 
should be calculated. SEAD can be utilized with some 
appropriate authentication and key distribution 
techniques. However determining such a technique is 
not simple. Brijesh [19] discusses attacks against 
distance vector routing protocols and describes 
techniques to secure them using Message 
Authentication Codes. 
Songbai et al., [1] proposed a SAODV which is 
a MANET routing protocol that can withstand black hole 
attack. AODV is a broadly used network routing 
protocol for MANETs. The propose of AODV shows 
some concentration to security issues, therefore 
consequential in the defenselessness of such MANET 
to the black hole attack. Based on AODV, the author 
suggested and realizes AODV suffering black hole 
attack - BAODV (Bad Ad Hoc On-demand Distance 
Vector Routing suffering black hole attack) that can 
imitate black hole attack to MANET by one of nodes as 
a malicious one in network. BAODV can be considered 
as AODV that is utilized in MANET which suffers from 
black hole attack. According BAODV, author also 
presents a secure and effective MANET routing 
protocol, the SAODV protocol that focuses on dealing 
with the security flaws of the AODV protocol and is 
accomplished to overcome the black hole attack.  
Papadimitratos et al., [2] deal with the security 
issues of route discovery in mobile ad hoc networks, 
providing a lightweight, however robust, routing 
protocol, the distance-vector secure routing protocol 
(DV-SRP). DV-SRP identifies on-demand multiple routes 
that are utilized among the network, devoid of clearly 
offering network connectivity. DV-SRP merges the 
merits of the kind of route discovery initially provided by 
AODV with security and therefore flexible to opposition 
that interrupt route discovery. 
Pirzada et al., [3] proposed a secure routing 
with the AODV Protocol. Because of their enhanced 
nature, ad-hoc networks are often utilized in non-secure 
situation that formulates them vulnerable to attacks. 
These attacks are offered by chipping in the malicious 
nodes adjacent to various network services. Routing 
protocols that work as the necessary force in these 
networks are a general target of these nodes. AODV is 
the commonly utilized routing protocols that are 
presently experiencing extensive research and 
development. AODV is in accordance with the distance 
vector routing, excluding the updates are shared not 
based on a periodic origin but on an as per accordance 
with the needs. The control packets enclose a hop-
count and sequence number field that finds the 
freshness of routing updates. Since these fields are 
changeable, it generates a possible weakness that is 
often exploited by malicious nodes to advertise good 
routes. Likewise, broadcasting of routing updates in 
clear text also reveals vital data about the network 
topology that is once more a possible security hazard. 
The author provides a novel and pragmatic technique 
for securing the ad-hoc on-demand distance vector 
routing protocol that guards against a number of 
attacks performed against mobile ad-hoc wireless 
networks. 
Sanzgiri et al., [4] proposed authenticated 
routing for ad hoc networks. Initially, only the issue of 
offering effective techniques for finding paths in very 
dynamic networks was considered, without considering 
security. Since security is not considered, there are a 
various treats that can be used to influence the routing 
in an ad hoc network. The author describes these 
threats in this paper, particularly explaining their effects 
on ad hoc on-demand distance vector and dynamic 
source routing. Authenticated Routing for Ad hoc 
Networks (ARAN) protocol is proposed in this approach 
which uses public-key cryptographic techniques to 
counter all the attacks. ARAN can provide secure 
routing in environments where nodes are authorized to 
participate but in situations where participants are not to 
be authorized, it does not respond. The simulation and 
experimentation of the proposed ARAN clearly shows 
that the performance of the proposed approach is very 
significant in finding secure routes within an ad hoc 
network. 
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Khan et al., [5] provided a security Adaptive 
Protocol Suite: Ranked Neighbor Discovery (RND) and 
Security Adaptive AODV (SA-AODV). Due to the raise in 
popularity and demand of mobility and ad hoc 
networking, weakness of wireless networks is also 
becoming a crucial issue. This study focuses on the 
security aspects of wireless communication, and 
proposes a technique with an enhanced security 
features. The proposed RND and SA-AODV routing 
protocol provides best solution for the security 
problems the neighbor discovery and the routing 
protocol for transmission are also included in this 
proposed approach. Based on distance metrics, the 
neighbor discovery phase contains the determination of 
trusted neighbors, which leads to trust ranking. This 
routing protocol provides a security adapted route from 
the source to its destination based on the trusted 
neighbors, and the required security level. The key 
benefit of this proposed approach is that a route is 
obtained with a user-defined level of security for a 
specific application. Thus the tow routing protocols 
provides a total solution for a secured environment for 
wireless transmission with security features. 
Gurrero Zapata et al., [6] suggested Securing 
Adhoc Routing Protocols. The problem of integrating 
security methods into routing protocols for ad hoc 
networks is considered in this paper. Security solutions 
like IPSec are not appropriate. A security mechanism for 
AODV to protect its routing information is considered in 
this paper. The author also discusses about the 
application of the proposed approaches to other similar 
routing protocols. Moreover, how a key management 
method could be used in combination with the 
proposed solution is also discussed in this paper. 
Davide et al., [7] proposed a securing AODV: 
the A-SAODV secure routing prototype. Mobile ad hoc 
networks create new type of security issues, resulted by 
their characteristics of collaborative and open systems 
and by restricted accessibility of resources. In this 
paper, the author considers a Wi-Fi connectivity data 
link layer as a basis and deals with routing security. The 
author elaborates the implementation of the secure 
AODV protocol extension that includes tuning approach 
which is intended at enhancing its performance. The 
author provides an adaptive method that enhances 
SAODV behavior. In addition, the author examines the 
adaptive strategy and another method which delays the 
confirmation of digital signatures.  
Table 1. Overview of Existing Techniques 
Method Overview 
[1] Withstand Black Hole attack. 
[2] 
More robust and efficient in eliminating 
disrupt route discovery. 
[3] 
Guards against a number of attacks 
performed against mobile ad-hoc 
wireless networks. 
[4] 
Uses public-key cryptographic 
techniques to counter all the attacks. 
Very significant in finding secure 
routes within an ad hoc network. 
[5] 
Based on distance metrics, the 
neighbor discovery phase contains the 
determination of trusted neighbors, 
which leads to trust ranking. Route is 
obtained with a user-defined level of 
security for a specific application. 
[6] Usage of Key Management. 
[7] 
Some enhancement is performed in 
SAODV to improve the performance 
[11] 
ARAN, a routing protocol for ad hoc 
networks that utilizes authentication 
and needs the utilization of a trusted 
certificate server. 
[13], 
[14], 
[15] 
Usage of Hack chains for security.  
[19] 
Message Authentication Codes used 
for Security. 
The overview of existing secure routing protocol 
is provided in table 1. These available techniques will 
helps in understanding the actual problems existing in 
developing the secure protocol. By analyzing those 
existing protocols, some techniques like digital 
signature, hash chains, etc., can be used together to 
achieve better secure routing protocol. 
III. Conclusion 
Mobile Ad Hoc Network is a multi-hop wireless 
network of mobile nodes, structuring a temporary 
network with no help from several recognized 
infrastructure or centralized administration. Because of 
the lack of some committed routers, each node needs 
to donate towards the configuration and protection of 
the routing framework. As there are no centrally 
administered secure routers, attackers can attack the 
network with ease. To overcome this better routing 
protocol must be used. AODV is the widely used routing 
protocol for MANET. But this protocol fails to deliver 
security benefits. For providing security to MANET, 
SAODV is used as routing protocol for MANET. This 
involves the usage of digital signature, hash chains, 
etc., In this paper, a survey is performed on the existing 
routing protocols for MANET. Mainly their security 
support is analyzed which helps for developing better 
security enabled routing protocol. 
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